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I.

INTRODUCTION
1

In State ex rel. Commissioner of Transportation v. Kettleson, the
Minnesota Supreme Court once again faced the eminent domain
doctrine and its ever pliable public use provision.
The
government’s use of eminent domain to acquire property for a
2
typical highway project is generally uncontroversial and involves
3
the easiest cases of public use. However, Kettleson involved a
unique set of facts that distinguished it from the many
unremarkable right-of-way acquisitions, by condemnation or
otherwise, that the state and county highway departments initiate
4
every Minnesota road construction season.
In Kettleson, a road reconstruction project effectively
landlocked an improved parcel of land when the project
eliminated that parcel’s driveway to the adjacent highway. To
remedy the problem, the Minnesota Department of Transportation
(MnDOT) exercised its eminent domain authority, taking a
portion of a neighboring parcel to create a new access road to the
isolated parcel. This led to another eminent domain challenge
alleging that the taking of private property was without a valid
public use. By upholding the taking, the Minnesota Supreme
1. 801 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 2011).
2. 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.06[3][a] (rev.
3d. ed. 2009).
3. LARRY W. THOMAS, TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH
PROGRAM, LEGAL DIGEST 56: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF POST-KELO LEGISLATION ON
STATE TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS 8 (2012) (citing Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization
in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657, 661 (2007)), available at
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_lrd_56.pdf.
4. See MINN. DEP’T TRANSP., GUIDE FOR PROPERTY OWNERS (2007), available at
http://www.dot.state.mn.us/row/pdfs/Guide_for_Property_Owners_wo_graphics
.pdf (providing a very general overview of MnDOT’s right-of-way acquisition
procedure).
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Court reached the correct decision. However, the court’s public
use analysis leaves something to be desired. This note will attempt
to fill that void.
In order to put this case in its proper context, Part II of this
note will provide a brief introduction of eminent domain, the
public use requirement, and how the public use requirement has
been interpreted at the federal level and in Minnesota. Part III will
outline the facts, arguments, and holding of Kettleson. The analysis
in Part IV is intended as an attempt to contextualize the case
among other landlocked property cases and demonstrate that the
court made the correct public use decision by analyzing persuasive
authorities from Minnesota and other jurisdictions, and economic
theory. There is no conclusive principle of public use. Instead, the
courts are left to balance the facts of each case to locate a
legitimate public benefit and to restrain condemning authorities
from acting arbitrarily and capriciously, if necessary. Without a
firm test to apply, no one fact is controlling. By reviewing
persuasive precedent, similar cases, and an applicable economic
theory, this analysis seeks to provide points of reference within the
larger body of public use analysis in an effort to bring further
support to the court’s decision.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

Eminent Domain: Nature, Definition, and Origin
5

The power of eminent domain, which results in
condemnation when exercised, is at its very essence “the state6
compelled transfer of property.”
It is further defined, with
inclusion of the public use limitation, as “the power of the
sovereign to take property for public use without the owner’s
7
consent.” It is said that the power is an inherent sovereign right
5. The term eminent domain is derivative of the Latin phrase dominium
eminens, which translates to “supreme lordship” and was first used by Dutch jurist
Hugo Grotius “to emphasize that ‘the property of subjects is under the eminent
domain of the state’ so that the state may use, alienate, or destroy such property
‘not only in the case of extreme necessity . . . but for end of public utility.’” Daniel
B. Kelly, Acquiring Land Through Eminent Domain: Justifications, Limitations, and
Alternatives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 345
(Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
6. Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and Policy,
11 ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (1980).
7. See SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 1.11.
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8

that exists in absolute and unlimited form, not constitutionally
9
granted to the government, but constitutionally limited. The
concept of eminent domain has an expansive history spanning
10
centuries and cultures, though its precise origin is lost in
11
obscurity. In early England, property was taken by the king and
parliament under various circumstances, but there appeared to be
a lack of any discrete body of law that could be categorized as
eminent domain and neatly linked to our contemporary concept of
12
the power.
Early colonial America also lacks a neat narrative to cleanly
13
track the modern development of the concept. There were many
instances of nonconsensual land transfers, including the building
14
of dams, the building of mills, and the draining of private land.
And, it is interesting to note, especially in the context of the
Kettleson case, that the earliest record of eminent domain in the
15
United States was for building roads.

8. Id. § 1.14[2] (“[T]he power comes into being eo instante with the
establishment of the government and continues as long as the government
endures. It does not require recognition by constitutional provision, but exists in
absolute and unlimited form.”).
9. Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (“The right is the offspring of
political necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its
fundamental law.”); Barmel v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist., 201 Minn. 622,
624, 277 N.W. 208, 209 (1938) (“[T]he power of eminent domain being an
incident of sovereignty, the time, manner, and occasion of its exercise are wholly
in the control and discretion of the legislature, except as restrained by the
constitution.” (quoting Fairchild v. St. Paul, 46 Minn. 540, 542, 49 N.W. 325, 325
(1891))).
10. See SACKMAN, supra note 2, §§ 1.2--1.23 (providing a perspective on the
origin and history of eminent domain, reaching as far back as biblical antiquity,
and including Roman times).
11. Meidinger, supra note 6, at 4. Scholars debate whether the concept of
eminent domain existed in any recognizable form as far back as ancient Rome. Id.
at 6. Some commentators point to Rome’s relatively advanced road and aqueduct
infrastructure as evidence of its early use in some form. Id. at 7.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Id. at 13.
14. Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491,
500 (2006).
15. Meidinger, supra note 6, at 13 (noting a 1639 Massachusetts statute which
“authorized county courts, upon a complaint stating that a highway was needed, to
appoint local citizens to lay one out” and provided compensation for affected
landowners).
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“Public Use” and the Takings Clause

The limitations on eminent domain power in colonial America
16
The familiar “public use” limitation first
were fairly vague.
emerged in 1776 when it was inserted into Pennsylvania’s and
17
Virginia’s constitutions. In 1789 the United States Constitution
was amended by the Bill of Rights, and the “public use” language
18
was inserted in the Fifth Amendment.
The language of the
amendment’s familiar Takings Clause is, “[N]or shall private
19
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
Pursuant to the Takings Clause, the valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain in the United States is subject to only two
20
prerequisites: public use and compensation.
Unfortunately, public use has been an ambiguous concept
from the beginning and defining it can often be the most elusive
21
task in condemnation cases. Throughout the nineteenth century
the country’s soaring demand for new infrastructure fueled an
expansion of the use of eminent domain by both public and private
22
entities.
During this time two different schools of thought
16. Cohen, supra note 14, at 504. After the Revolutionary War the original
thirteen states gradually added the public use provision to their constitutions, but
these provisions “often did not specify the actual permitted uses and limitations of
the eminent domain power.” Id.
17. Id.
18. Meidinger, supra note 6, at 17.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. Id. This note will not discuss the meaning or purpose of “just
compensation” in any substantive manner. This is not to trivialize this component
of the takings clause, but simply it was not put into controversy in Kettleson. This
note will also not cover in any depth the necessity component of eminent domain.
While Kettleson involved pleadings and a holding on this element, the thrust of the
case was a public use challenge. As Kettleson noted, the requisite necessity is
reasonable necessity to further a proper purpose, not absolute necessity. State ex
rel. Commissioner of Transportation v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 167 (Minn. 2011). A
finding of necessity will only be overruled if the taking was arbitrary and
capricious. Id. For a thorough treatment of the origin and meaning of the
necessity requirement, see generally Robert C. Bird & Lynda J. Oswald, Necessity as
a Check on State Eminent Domain Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 99 (2009).
21. See, e.g., State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 16, 176 N.W. 159, 161 (1920)
(“The term ‘public use’ is flexible . . . .”). See generally SACKMAN, supra note 2,
§ 7.02[1] (“‘[P]ublic use’ . . . does not have a precise and fixed meaning.”).
22. Though eminent domain is a government power, during this period the
power was delegated to private turnpike, canal, and railroad companies. See
Meidinger, supra note 6, at 26–27. Illustrative of the rapid increase in
infrastructure is the fact that between 1840 and 1860 U.S. railroads expanded
from 3000 miles of track to 30,000 miles. Id. “As the [railroad] industry hit its
stride in the next several decades, so did its use of eminent domain.” Id.
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emerged as to the nature of the power: the narrow interpretation
23
and the broad interpretation. The narrow definition emphasizes
24
actual, physical use or employment of the property by the public.
The broader definition takes into account the wider public benefit
or advantage. Under this view, it has been said:
Any exercise of eminent domain which tends to enlarge
resources, increase industrial energies, or promote the
productive power of any considerable number of
inhabitants of a state or community manifestly contributes
to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole
25
community and thus constitutes a valid public use.
1.

Early U.S., Berman & Midkiff

By the early twentieth century the United States Supreme
26
The
Court had written off the narrow view of public use.
contemporary view of public use, specifically characterized by
judicial deference to legislative determinations of public use, began
to take shape in 1954 when the Supreme Court decided the
27
influential case Berman v. Parker. The appellants in Berman sought
to enjoin the condemnation of their property, which the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency sought under the District
28
of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. The taking of a nonblighted department store within an otherwise largely blighted
redevelopment area was challenged on the basis that it was not for
29
a public use as required by the Takings Clause.
The court
articulated the prevailing view of judicial deference to legislative
determinations of public use when it stated:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the
23. SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 7.02[1].
24. Id. § 7.02[2].
25. Id. § 7.02[3].
26. Rindge Co. v. L.A. Cnty., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (“[It is] not essential
that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, should directly
enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to constitute a public use.”);
Cohen, supra note 14, at 509 (“The inadequacy of the use by the general public as
a universal test is established.” (citing Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v.
Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916))).
27. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
28. Id. at 28–29.
29. Id.
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public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it
be Congress legislating concerning the District of
Columbia, or the States legislating concerning local
affairs. This principle admits of no exception merely
because the power of eminent domain is involved. The
role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is
being exercised for public purpose is an extremely narrow
30
one.
Thirty years later in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the
31
next major public use challenge reached the Supreme Court.
The Court took much the same approach, heavily citing the Berman
decision. In Midkiff, the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967, “which
created a land condemnation scheme whereby title in real property
is taken from lessors and transferred to lessees in order to reduce
32
the concentration of land ownership,” was challenged on the basis
of not having a public purpose to sustain a valid exercise of
eminent domain. Once again, the Court deferred to the legislative
body’s public use determination. The Court stated:
In short, the Court has made clear that it will not
substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to
what constitutes a public use “unless the use be palpably
without reasonable foundation.” . . .
. . . But where the exercise of the eminent domain power
is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the
Court has never held a compensated taking to be
33
proscribed by the Public Use Clause.
The seminal decisions of Berman and Midkiff paved the way for Kelo
34
v. City of New London, the famous Supreme Court public use
35
36
decision that was wildly unpopular, yet arguably consistent.
30. Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
31. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
32. Id. at 229. The Hawaii Legislature concluded that this concentration of
ownership “was responsible for skewing the State’s residential fee simple market,
inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare.” Id. at 232.
33. Id. at 241 (citation omitted).
34. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
35. In 2005, Zogby and Saint Index conducted a national survey on Kelo in
which 95% and 81% of respondents, respectively, opposed the decision. Ilya
Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV.
2100, 2108–11 (2009) (summarizing the survey results).
36. Compare John M. Zuck, Kelo v. City of New London: Despite the Outcry, the
Decision is Firmly Supported by Precedent—However, Eminent Domain Critics Still Have
Gained Ground, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 187, 192 (2007) (“[U]ltimately the Supreme
Court has remained consistent in its decisions.”), with James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo
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The Kelo Decision

Kelo involved a public use challenge by owners of non-blighted
property located within a larger area targeted by the state and the
37
city in a comprehensive redevelopment plan. The City of New
London had been identified by the State of Connecticut as an
economically distressed area and the redevelopment plan was
38
intended to spur economic development. The appellant’s land
was taken through the power of eminent domain simply because it
happened to be located within the boundaries of the
39
redevelopment area.
A divided Supreme Court, citing Berman and Midkiff,
reaffirmed the precedential, judicial deference, stating, “[For]
more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify
40
the use of the takings power.”
Citing the “comprehensive
character” of the redevelopment plan, the “thorough deliberation
that preceded its adoption, and [the Court’s] limited scope of . . .
review,” the majority held that “[b]ecause that plan unquestionably
serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the
41
public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.” Perhaps the
most influential words of the decision were contained in the final
paragraph where Justice Stevens reminded state legislatures that
“nothing in [the Court’s] opinion precludes any State from placing
42
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”

Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 128 (2009)
(“Such a myopic assessment is sadly wide of the mark. It rests largely upon
sweeping language in previous Supreme Court opinions rather than a careful look
at the factual circumstances at issue in particular cases.”).
37. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474–75. The ninety-acre redevelopment plan included
the creation of Fort Trumbull State Park and a $300 million research facility to be
built by pharmaceutical company Pfizer Inc. Id. at 473. The Pfizer facility was
seen as the catalyst for the revitalization of the redevelopment area and the New
London downtown. Id. at 474.
38. Id. at 473.
39. Id. at 475.
40. Id. at 483.
41. Id. at 484.
42. Id. at 489.
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The Legislative Response to Kelo

Following Kelo, the perceived threat to private property rights
led to a public and media firestorm, and ignited a national debate
43
on the proper limitation of eminent domain. State legislatures
across the country took Justice Stevens’ words to heart, as
approximately forty-three states, including Minnesota, ultimately
44
amended their eminent domain statutes. Many of these legislative
amendments were specifically targeted at limiting eminent domain
powers in the economic development context, especially where
45
there was a transfer to “private” entities. However, commentators
have found that, with certain exceptions, these statutory changes
have neither been effective in curbing states’ abilities to take
property for economic development purposes, nor in providing
46
citizens with increased protection of their property.
In light of the Kettleson decision it is especially relevant to note
the cumulative effect, if any, this wave of new legislation has had on
road projects and the ability of highway departments to use
eminent domain in the execution of their work. The National
Cooperative Highway Research Program (the “NCHRP”) published
47
a fairly comprehensive report addressing this question.
The
report concluded that “most state DOTs [Departments of
Transportation] have not been affected by the states’ constitutional
48
and legislative changes in response to the Kelo decision.” In fact,
at least thirteen states explicitly provided “that the post-Kelo
restrictions do not apply to takings for the purpose of constructing,
49
maintaining, or operating streets and highways.” However, some
43. See generally Michael Allan Wolf, Hysteria Versus History: Public Use in the
Public Eye, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN
15 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) (dissecting the media coverage and subsequent
public reaction after the Kelo decision was announced).
44. Somin, supra note 35, at 2102.
45. Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal
Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Year Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 707 (2011).
46. Somin, supra note 35, at 2171 (“Despite broad and strongly felt public
opposition to Kelo and economic development takings . . . the majority of states
failed to enact effective reform legislation banning them.”); see also Mihaly &
Smith, supra note 45, at 708 (“[M]uch of the legislation ‘passed in the wake of Kelo
was substantially cosmetic and will likely have little or no effect on economic
development takings.’” (quoting EDWARD J. ERLER, IN KELO’S WAKE 12–13 (2008),
available at http://www.hillsdale.edu/images/userImages/rvanopstal/Page_6542
/Erler_2_Final.doc)).
47. THOMAS, supra note 3.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id. at 9.
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state DOTs reported that eminent domain reforms have increased
50
right-of-way acquisition costs and imposed new procedural time
constraints that make the use of eminent domain less attractive as a
51
property acquisition tool. Another common element of eminent
domain reforms identified by the NCHRP is the requirement that
condemned property be retained for public ownership and
52
prohibited from being transferred to a private entity.
C.

Eminent Domain in Minnesota
1.

Public Use

The constitutional restraint in Minnesota mirrors that of the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, providing, “Private property
shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without
53
City of
just compensation therefor[e], first paid or secured.”
Duluth v. State is a foundational and widely cited Minnesota case
that illustrates the state’s adoption of the broad definition of public
54
use.
In City of Duluth, the court upheld the condemnation of
private, commercial property in order to develop a new, privately
55
operated papermill.
The court reasoned that, despite the fact
that the condemnation would benefit private interests, the taking
was not unconstitutional because it would further the broader
public purposes of providing employment, increasing the city tax
56
base, and revitalizing a deteriorating urban area.
The court
endorsed the broad view of public use when stating, “What
constitutes a public use . . . is, of course, a judicial decision;
however, in light of the deferential scope of review, this court has
57
construed the words ‘public use’ broadly.” Historically, the court
50. Id. at 24.
51. Id. at 25.
52. Id. at 10. The language of these public use definitions that require public
ownership, are extremely similar to Minnesota’s definition of public use. See infra
note 66. For example, Iowa’s definition of public use provides in part, “The
possession, occupation, and enjoyment of property by the general public or
governmental entities.” THOMAS, supra note 3, at 10.
53. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. It should also be noted that the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Chi., B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
54. 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986).
55. Id. at 760.
56. Id. at 763 (citing City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn.
1980)).
57. Id.
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has used the words “public use” interchangeably with the words
58
“public purpose.” Subsequent high profile Minnesota economic
59
development cases affirmed this broad definition of public use,
but resistance to this liberal application of eminent domain began
60
to build. Like it had in so many other states, the Kelo decision
provided the final impetus for the Legislature to act.
2.

2006 Legislative Revision

In April 2006, shortly after Kelo, the Minnesota Legislature
61
took up the task of scrutinizing the eminent domain statute and
analyzing the definition of public use, particularly in the economic
62
development context.
By May of the same year, a significant
63
revision to the statute was enacted (the “2006 Amendments”). Of
64
particular interest to this case are the preemption clause and the
65
new definition of public use and public purpose.
Minnesota
Statutes section 117.025, subdivision 11(a) provides the critical

58. Id.
59. See Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City of Richfield v. Walser Auto
Sales, Inc. 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002) (3-3 decision) (affirming that
condemnation of land containing operating auto dealerships, in connection with
a redevelopment plan, mainly involving the construction of the Best Buy corporate
headquarters, is a public use and is authorized under the Minnesota economic
development statute, section 469 (2000)).
60. Paul B. Zisla, How Recent Case Law and Legislative Developments in Eminent
Domain Will Impact You, in NAT’L BUS. INST., EMINENT DOMAIN: LEGAL UPDATE 1, 4
(2006) (describing the Minnesota Auto Dealers’ post-Walser effort to lobby the
legislature for changes to the eminent domain statute).
61. MINN. STAT. §§ 117.012–.57 (2010).
62. See MINN. S. COMM. ON TRANSP., S. 84-2006 TRP, Reg. Sess. (2006), reprinted
in MN S. Comm. Up., 2006 TRP (Mar. 31, 2006) (Westlaw). During this
committee hearing, Senator Thomas Bakk, lead author of the revisions to the
eminent domain statute, stated his “goal with the bill is to stop the use of eminent
domain for economic development purposes.” Id. In addition, he said that “[t]he
heart of the bill is in provisions defining public uses or public purposes.” Id.
63. Act of May 19, 2006, ch. 214, 2006 Minn. Laws 195, 195 (“An act relating
to eminent domain; making changes to and regulating the exercise of eminent
domain; providing for public use or purpose and providing other definitions;
providing for notice, hearing, and other procedural requirements; providing for
attorney fees and additional forms of compensation . . . .”).
64. MINN. STAT. § 117.012 (2010). Subdivision 1 added the following
preemption language: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including any
. . . statute, . . . all condemning authorities . . . must exercise the power of eminent
domain in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.” Id. Subdivision 2
echoes the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions by again expressly stating that
“[e]minent domain may only be used for a public use or a public purpose.” Id.
65. Id. § 117.025, subdiv. 11.
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thrust of the amendment by providing, “‘[P]ublic use’ or ‘public
purpose’ means, exclusively: (1) the possession, occupation,
ownership, and enjoyment of the land by the general public, or by
66
public agencies.” In comparison to other jurisdictions’ eminent
domain statute revisions, the 2006 Amendments are seen as
establishing intermediate limitations on the use of eminent domain
67
for economic development purposes.
3.

MnDOT’s Eminent Domain Authority
68

Though not directly at issue in this case, it is relevant to
understand the MnDOT constitutional mandate and eminent
domain powers. The Minnesota Constitution provides that “a
trunk highway system . . . shall be constructed, improved, and
69
maintained as public highways by the state.”
Pursuant to this
constitutional provision, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held
that condemnation of land for the purpose of the trunk highway
70
system is an established public use. The Legislature has delegated
to the Commissioner of Transportation (the “commissioner”) the
71
responsibility of carrying out this constitutional provision. Under
this legislative grant, MnDOT has “broad authority in highway
72
matters.” This authority includes selecting “the particular course

66. Id. The balance of the definition of public use or public purpose
includes: “the creation or functioning of a public service corporation; or
mitigation of a blighted area, remediation of an environmentally contaminated
area, reduction of abandoned property, or removal of a public nuisance.” Id.
Subdivision 11 concludes by stating, “The public benefits of economic
development, including an increase in tax base, tax revenues, employment, or
general economic health, do not by themselves constitute a public use or public
purpose.” Id.
67. Mihaly & Smith, supra note 45, at 713–14. The authors note that the 2006
Amendments are less strict than other states with “strong limitations” primarily
because Minnesota does not prohibit economic development benefits from being
a reason to use eminent domain, though they cannot be the only reason. Id.
68. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 162 n.1
(Minn. 2011) (noting that the taking of land to be used exclusively for the
highway was not challenged).
69. MINN. CONST. art. XIV, § 2.
70. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hilton v. Voll, 155 Minn. 72, 72, 192 N.W. 188, 188
(1923) (“[T]he Constitution determines that the taking of the right of way
necessary for the trunk highway system is for public use.”).
71. MINN. STAT. § 161.20, subdiv. 1 (“The commissioner shall carry out the
provisions of article 14, section 2, of the Constitution . . . .”).
72. State ex rel. Head v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 233, 170 N.W.2d 95, 96
(1969).
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73

and necessary land for the trunk highways.”
By statute, MnDOT is authorized “to acquire . . . by eminent
domain proceedings as provided by law, in fee or such lesser estate
as the commissioner deems necessary, all lands and properties
necessary . . . in laying out, constructing, maintaining, and
74
improving the trunk highway system.” Much like the legislative
decisions of public use in City of Duluth, Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo,
MnDOT’s decisions regarding locating the highway right-of-way are
75
given substantial deference by the courts. Drawing on decades of
precedent, State ex rel. Mondale v. Ohman provided a succinct
statement of the broad judicial deference given to MnDOT by
stating “the courts may not interfere with the determination of the
commissioner of highways, acting for the state in its sovereign
capacity, if his determinations have a reasonable basis and are not
76
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory.”
MnDOT also has been granted statutory authority to use
eminent domain to address the issue of access to property isolated
77
as a result of highway construction. Minnesota Statutes section
161.24, subdivision 4, entitled “Access to isolated property,”
provides:
When the . . . reconstruction of a trunk highway closes off
any other . . . private road, or entrance at the boundary of
the trunk highway, the commissioner may, in mitigation
of damages . . . construct a road either within or outside
the limits of the trunk highway, connecting the closedoff . . . private road . . . with another public highway. In
determining whether to build the road within or outside
the limits of the trunk highway, the commissioner may
take into consideration economy to the state and local
78
traffic needs.
The statute goes on to state that “[a]ll lands necessary for
connecting a . . . private road . . . to another public highway . . .
79
The phrases “in
may be acquired by . . . condemnation.”
mitigation of damages” and “economy to the state” are indicative of

73. Voll, 155 Minn. at 73, 192 N.W. at 189.
74. MINN. STAT. § 161.20, subdiv. 2(a)(1).
75. See, e.g., Voll, 155 Minn. at 76, 192 N.W. at 190.
76. 263 Minn. 115, 119–20, 116 N.W.2d 101, 104 (1962) (citing State ex rel.
Peterson v. Severson, 194 Minn. 644, 261 N.W. 469 (1935)).
77. MINN. STAT. § 161.24, subdiv. 4.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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the need for state highway departments to take into account the
financial consequences of their planning decisions. And the
problem of isolated property—as contemplated in this statute and
as encountered in Kettleson—makes salient this point.
III. THE KETTLESON DECISION
A.

Facts of the Case

In 2008, 3½ miles of Trunk Highway 61 (TH 61) overlooking
Lake Superior between Tofte and Lutsen was due for
80
reconstruction (the Project).
MnDOT’s plan for the Project
included adding wider shoulders, passing lanes, and turning lanes
81
in order to improve highway safety.
To achieve the Project’s
objectives, MnDOT determined it must acquire additional right-of82
way property from landowners adjacent to the Project area.
Exercising its statutory authority, on August 29, 2008, MnDOT filed
a condemnation petition in Cook County District Court seeking
transfer of title and possession of certain portions of twenty-three
83
parcels along the Project area.
One property affected by this
petition, and the subject of this discussion, was appellant Richard
Lepak’s unimproved property (Parcel 15) north of and adjacent to
84
TH 61. In its petition, MnDOT sought to take a 110-foot-deep
strip of Lepak’s Parcel 15—the full length of his property adjacent
85
to and parallel with TH 61. The 75-foot-deep strip of Parcel 15
closest to the road was to be used exclusively for the planned
86
improvements of TH 61 and was not challenged by Lepak.

80. MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ANNUAL REPORT ON MAJOR HIGHWAY PROJECTS
A12 (2011), available at http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/mandated
/110142.pdf (summarizing the Project’s history, objectives, schedule, and cost
estimate).
81. Id.
82. Respondent’s Brief at 3, State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801
N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 2011) (No. A09-1894), 2010 WL 7367170, at *3.
83. Appellant’s Brief & Addendum at 5, Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160 (No. A091894), 2010 WL 7367169at *5.
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id. In addition, MnDOT sought a temporary easement taking of a twentyfoot section of land immediately north of and adjacent to the fee taking.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 4–5. The temporary easement taking was not
challenged by Lepak. Id. at 3.
86. Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 83, at 6–7.
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Lepak’s and MnDOT’s Arguments

At the November 18, 2008, hearing on MnDOT’s petition,
Lepak objected to the taking of the remaining 35-foot-wide strip of
87
the 110-foot-deep fee taking. Lepak objected on the basis that the
35-foot strip was to be used to construct a new road to provide the
neighboring, improved Parcel 14, directly to the west of Parcel 15,
88
with access to the reconstructed TH 61. Parcel 14 previously had
direct access to TH 61 by a driveway on its own property, but that
access would be eliminated by the reconstruction project,
89
rendering it landlocked. Lepak characterized this new road to be
built across the entirety of his as a “private access” used to restore
90
Parcel 14’s connection to TH 61. He contended that, as a private
access, it was an improper taking because it was “not for a public
use or public purpose and, therefore, is prohibited by Minnesota
91
law.”
Further, Lepak argued that the judicial deference and broad
construction of public use and public purpose articulated in City of
92
Duluth was overruled by the 2006 Amendments. Lepak contended
that the new narrow, exclusive definition of public use and public
93
purpose “repudiated the broad interpretation” of these terms.
Finally, Lepak asserted that MnDOT’s statutory authority in section
161.24 to provide access to isolated properties requires the broad
interpretation of public use that was “preempted by the 2006
Amendments to Minnesota’s eminent domain laws to the extent it
94
purports to authorize such a taking.”
In support of the taking, MnDOT asserted a series of
arguments, all of which paralleled common arguments expressed
95
in similar cases. MnDOT characterized the road, not as a “private
road,” but as a “public access road” that will serve three parcels, not
96
97
just Parcel 14, and will be open to the traveling public. MnDOT
87. Id. at 5–6.
88. Id. at 6.
89. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 6–7.
90. Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 83, at 6.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 11–12.
93. Id. at 11.
94. Id. at 12.
95. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
96. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 6. A third parcel, Parcel 16, which is
also unimproved and directly east of Parcel 15, was involved in this condemnation
but was not at issue in the case. Id.
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sought to distinguish a public road from a private road by
reasoning:
It is the right of travel by public, and not the exercise of
the right, that constitutes a public roadway. The actual
amount of travel should not be material—if it is open to
all who desire to use it, [it] is a public roadway even
though it may be used by only a limited portion of the
98
traveling public . . . .
MnDOT also contended that access road falls within the new
statutory definition of public use, specifically the “possession,
99
occupation, ownership, and enjoyment” clause. By retaining title
and possession of the access road and not transferring an interest
to a private party, MnDOT would satisfy this requirement.
In addition, MnDOT argued that Minnesota’s public purpose
analysis only requires that a public purpose be established for the
whole of a project, not for each individual aspect, such as the access
100
road. MnDOT pointed out that past Minnesota eminent domain
cases were analyzed under a two-step framework of public use and
reasonable necessity, and that the 2006 Amendments have no
language demonstrating legislative intent to change that framework
by adding additional steps of analyzing separate components of the
101
challenged taking.
MnDOT offered additional statutory authority to condemn a
102
portion of Lepak’s land. MnDOT asserted the authority found in
103
both Minnesota Statutes section 160.18 and section 161.24.
Section 160.18 provides that “road authorities . . . in relocating or
reconstructing an old highway shall construct suitable approaches
thereto within the limits of the right-of-way . . . so as to provide
104
abutting owners a reasonable means of access to such highway.”
Section 161.24 is an express provision for restoring access to
105
property isolated by a highway project.
Lastly, both Lepak and MnDOT recognized that this dispute

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 10–13.
Id. at 10–12.
Id. at 20–21.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 160.18, subdiv. 2 (2010).
Id. § 161.24.
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was one of economics and the efficient use of resources. MnDOT
pointed out that if the court held in Lepak’s favor, denying the
condemnation, the court would “invalidate a taking that affects just
a small portion of his unimproved property, which in turn would
result in the economic destruction of his neighbor’s improved
107
property. Such a result would hardly be fair or just.”
Lepak
countered that while MnDOT had a “substantial financial
incentive” to avoid compensating the owner of the landlocked
parcel for the “economic destruction” of that property, the new
narrow definition of public use made no mention of such an
108
Therefore, the taking was without
exercise of eminent domain.
legal basis.
C.

District Court and Court of Appeals Decisions

On November 25, 2008, one week after the original hearing,
109
the district court granted MnDOT’s condemnation petition.
110
Lepak appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The court of
appeals remanded the case back to the district court for a specific
finding on Lepak’s objection that the private-access access road was
111
not a public use or public purpose. In an August 12, 2009, order,
the district court held that the project as a whole provided a proper
public purpose, and MnDOT did not need to show a public
purpose for every aspect of the project, including the disputed
112
road.
The district court reached this conclusion by reasoning
that “once MnDOT establishes a broad public purpose, it need only
prove that a challenged aspect of the project is reasonably
113
necessary to further that purpose.”
The district court found the
widening of TH 61 had a legitimate public purpose and the
disputed access road to be reasonably necessary to serve the

106. See Appellant’s Brief & Addendum, supra note 83, at 8 (discussing the
State’s duty to compensate the owner of Parcel 14 for the lost access);
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 18.
107. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 18.
108. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2–4, State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v.
Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 2011) (No. A09-1894), 2010 WL 7367171.
109. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 3.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, No. A09–1894, 2010 WL
2813456, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 20, 2012); Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82,
at 2.
113. Kettleson, 2010 WL 2813456, at *2.
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114

legitimate highway expansion.
A divided court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling
115
in an unpublished decision dated July 20, 2010.
First, the court
of appeals found that the 2006 Amendments did not disturb the
long-standing judicial deference to a condemning authority’s
116
public use determination.
The court pointed out that the
deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review for public use
evaluations discussed in City of Duluth was still valid and cited with
117
approval subsequent to the statutory amendment.
Next, the
court concluded that the appellant’s assertion that the access road
118
Instead, citing
was to be a private driveway was without support.
the subdivision of Minnesota Statutes section 117.025 defining
public purpose as “the possession, occupation, ownership, and
enjoyment of the land by the general public, or by public agencies,”
the court determined that MnDOT was seeking to possess and
occupy a “public-highway access road for use and enjoyment by the
119
owners of three adjacent parcels of land.”
Therefore, a valid
120
public purpose was established.
The Minnesota Supreme Court
granted Lepak’s petition for further review to evaluate the validity
121
of the challenged taking in light of the new statutory definition.
D.

Minnesota Supreme Court Decision

The supreme court reached the same decision as the lower
courts, holding that the proposed taking fell “squarely within” the
122
To reach this conclusion,
new statutory definition of public use.
the court first found that the 2006 Amendments had not disturbed
123
the broad deference the courts give to condemning authorities.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *1.
117. Id. The court of appeals cited City of Willmar v. Kvam, 769 N.W.2d 775,
780 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009), and City of Granite Falls v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 742
N.W.2d 690, 697 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), to show that the previous standard had
been cited with approval. Kettleson, 2010 WL 2813456, at *1.
118. Id. at *2.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court also discussed reasonable necessity and found that “the
state provided a valid public purpose for the highway project and showed that the
taking was reasonably necessary to further that purpose.” Id. at *4.
121. State ex. rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Minn.
2011).
122. Id. at 166.
123. Id. at 165. The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals in finding
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Specifically, the 2006 Amendments did not change the legislative
124
The court
nature of the government’s eminent domain power.
pointed out that “MnDOT has been specifically authorized by the
Legislature to condemn property directly on its behalf” and that
“[n]othing in [section 117.02 of the 2006 Amendments] disturbs
the long-standing principle of deference by the courts to the
Commissioner’s legislative decision-making in condemning private
125
property to build highways.”
The court’s role is to ensure that
takings “are within such discretionary power rather than an
arbitrary or discriminatory exercise of the legislative
126
prerogatives.”
The court then enumerated three reasons why it found this
taking to fit squarely within the statutory definition of public use
and public purpose. First, it cited MnDOT’s broad authority to
administer the state’s transportation policies and plans and held
that the Highway 61 Project was “without question a transportation
plan with the over-arching purpose of providing a public
127
benefit.”
The court then reasoned that, because MnDOT would
hold title and possession to the access road, the statutory
requirement of “possession, occupation, ownership, and enjoyment
128
of the land by the general public, or by public agencies” was met.
Third, because the road would lie within the public right-of-way
and there was no evidence offered that the public would be
excluded, the court maintained that the “enjoyment of the access
129
road is established to be for the general public.” After asserting
these three points, the court concluded that “[w]hile no single fact
is controlling, we conclude, on the record before us, that MnDOT
130
has demonstrated a proper public purpose for the taking.”

the case law precedent for this deferential standard was still cited with approval
subsequent to the 2006 Amendments.
Id.; see also supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
124. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d at 165.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 165–66 (quoting Pearce v. Vill. of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 571, 118
N.W.2d 659, 671 (1962)).
127. Id. at 166.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 167.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The court’s holding that “no single fact is controlling” is
131
indicative of the ongoing difficulty, or perhaps impossibility, of
conclusively defining public use, even when the legislature speaks.
As the leading commentary on eminent domain states: “In any
given case, a use clearly conducive to the welfare of the community,
or which more closely conforms with the local practices and
conditions of the people of a state, governs the judiciary’s
132
construction of the meaning of ‘public use’ for that community.”
Add this expansive notion of judicial construction to the standard
that MnDOT decisions will not be interfered with as long they have
“a reasonable basis and are not arbitrary, capricious, or
133
discriminatory,” and one would understand why some say that
challenging public purpose in a road case “is likely a waste of time
134
and money.”
The court set the stage for its public use analysis by correctly
refuting Lepak’s contention that the 2006 Amendments overruled
decades of broad judicial deference to condemning authorities’
decisions. And it correctly reaffirmed the only if arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory standard of review. However, with no
Minnesota case directly on point and by confining its decision
strictly to the new statutory definition of public use, the court
offered a thin analysis of public use. The court omitted a large
volume of persuasive precedent that would have been helpful in
showing this decision’s place within the panoply of similar public
use challenges.
Defining public use “has never been
135
accomplished.”
So instead of trying to do the impossible in
defense of this decision, this analysis will draw on this array of
persuasive authority from Minnesota, other jurisdictions, and
economic theory, in an attempt to add color and clarity to the
Kettleson court’s public use holding.
These persuasive authorities suggest that the court properly
discerned the nature of a public road as it has been historically
recognized in Minnesota. Namely, public roads are defined by
131. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 44 (2004) (“A ‘public use’ defies absolute
definition for it changes with varying conditions of society . . . .”).
132. SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 7.02[1].
133. See MINN. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 80 and accompanying text.
134. Robert Lindall & Howard A. Roston, Litigation of Public Purpose, in
EMINENT DOMAIN LAW § 3, at 8 (Minn. CLE, 2006).
135. SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 7.02[1].
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open public access, not by a specific number of public users. The
court did not expressly rule on the continuing validity of section
161.24 and its “economy of state” rationale or whether the project
136
“taken as a whole” is controlling.
However, the court indirectly,
yet properly, recognized the validity of these arguments, which is
demonstrated by their wide application in a variety of similar
137
cases. Finally, while not discussed by the court, the fundamental
economic theory of eminent domain provides additional support to
the decision, even if this rationale falls outside of a traditional legal
analysis.
A.

Starting Off Right: Legislative Intent and the Arbitrary and
Capricious Standard

Before proceeding to discuss public use, it is necessary to
briefly address two critical points the court got right. First, the
court clearly rejected the argument that the 2006 Amendments
overruled the precedent of broad judicial deference to public
138
use. The court stated that all of its use of statutory interpretation
139
is to determine the intent of the Legislature. Part of this analysis
may include looking at the “circumstances surrounding the law’s
140
enactment.”
The 2006 Amendments were a direct consequence
of rulings, such as Kelo and Walser, where people’s homes and
businesses were being taken for economic development that
appeared to be for the benefit of large corporations like Best Buy
141
and Pfizer.
One of the lead drafters of the 2006 Amendments
stated that the amendments were to “stop the use of eminent
142
domain for economic development purposes.”
Considering
these circumstances surrounding the 2006 Amendments, it hardly
seems valid to say that the Legislature intended to create a regime
in Minnesota with a strict, narrow definition of public use rules in
all situations, including highway construction. By maintaining the
possibility that the benefits of economic development could still be
136. See State ex. rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166–67
(Minn. 2011).
137. See infra Part IV.B.2.
138. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d at 165–66.
139. Id. at 166.
140. Id.
141. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 474–75 (2005); Hous. &
Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City of Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc. 641 N.W.2d
885, 891 (Minn. 2002); supra notes 36 & 58 and accompanying text.
142. See MINN. S. COMM. ON TRANSP., supra note 62; text accompanying note 62.
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reasons for using eminent domain, the Legislature demonstrated it
was not endorsing the strict view of public use that Lepak
143
144
suggests. Constricting MnDOT’s “essential legislative function”
was not the Legislature’s intent and the supreme court correctly
recognized that.
Second, it is important to point out that the “not arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory” standard correctly applied by the
145
court is a high hurdle. It is difficult to find a published appellate
court decision where a MnDOT decision was overruled under this
146
standard.
One 2001 case was reversed because the eminent
domain statute permitted the condemnee to appeal the damage
147
award, but not the public use or necessity.
The statute was
deemed unconstitutional because condemnees are entitled to a
148
judicial review of these elements. Looking at the Kettleson facts, it
is hard to argue that MnDOT’s decision was arbitrary, capricious,
or discriminatory. The access road was placed so three adjoining
149
parcels would have opportunity to utilize it.
The testimony of
MnDOT’s engineer showed at least some level of forethought and
150
planning.
There were no allegations that Lepak was singled out
or given prejudicial treatment in any way. On balance, there is a
void of evidence of any arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory
actions by MnDOT that would make this a judicially reversible
legislative decision.

143. See MINN. STAT. §§ 117.012, 117.025, subdiv. 11; supra notes 64, 66 and
accompanying text.
144. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d at 163.
145. Id. at 165.
146. Searches in Westlaw under (“eminent domain” & “department of
transportation”), (“eminent domain” & “commissioner of highways”), and
(“eminent domain” & “county highway”) did not yield any decisions where the
court overturned a MnDOT decision about planning of highways. This is not
conclusive, but it at the very least shows the infrequency of such an occurrence.
One non-highway exercise of eminent domain that failed to meet this generous
benchmark is a case in which the University of Minnesota sought to condemn land
for which it had no specific purpose; the court found that a speculative stockpiling
of land for some unknown future use was an inadequate justification for a
condemnation action. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co., 552
N.W.2d 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
147. In re Damages to Rapp, 621 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
148. Id. at 785.
149. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 6.
150. Id. at 5.
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Finding the Public Use: The Power of Persuasive Precedent
1.

How to Distinguish Between a “Private” and “Public” Road

The court reached its public use conclusion in part by finding
that the access road is public because there was no evidence that
151
members of the public would be excluded from using it.
However, the court did not elaborate on why this made it a “public
road.” In Minnesota, distinguishing between a “private” and a
“public” road is not intuitively measured strictly by the quantity of
people directly using or benefiting from any given road. That a
public road is defined by open access to it by the public, not by
volume of use by the public is a proposition with strong precedent
152
in Minnesota, specifically under the Minnesota cartway statute.
This statute and its related case law are helpful for lending
persuasive support to the court’s holding.
A cartway “is merely a classification of a type of public road,
unique in character because it principally benefits an individual
153
instead of the general public.” Minnesota’s cartway statute reads
in part:
Upon petition presented to the town board by the owner
of a tract of land . . . who has no access thereto except
over a navigable waterway or over the lands of others, or
whose access thereto is less than two rods in width, the
town board by resolution shall establish a cartway at least
two rods wide connecting the petitioner’s land with a
154
public road.
155
The cartway statute does not apply to Kettleson, but it offers strong
151. State ex. rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn.
2011).
152. MINN. STAT. § 164.08 (2010). Many states have similar acts, sometimes
referring to them as private road acts that allow a landlocked property owner to
petition the local government to establish a road over the property of a neighbor
in order for the landlocked owner to have access to a public way. See Kristin
Kanski, Note, Property Law—Minnesota’s Lakeshore Property Owners Without Road Access
Find Themselves Up a Creek Without a Paddle—In Re Daniel for the Establishment of
Cartway, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 725, 729 n.34 (2003) (providing a list of similar
state statutes).
153. Kanski, supra note 152, at 726 n.4 (citing 39 AM. JUR. 2D Cartways § 6
(2002)).
154. MINN. STAT. § 164.08, subdiv. 2 (including different provisions depending
on the size of the parcel for which the petitioner is seeking relief).
155. If MnDOT had left Parcel 14 without a driveway, perhaps the owner could
have proceeded under the cartway statute. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 82, at 5.
However, Parcel 14 was likely not strictly landlocked as this concept is understood
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guidance as to how Minnesota courts have analyzed this difficult
private versus public distinction. In Rask v. Town Board, the
appellant made a similar argument to Lepak when it contended
that a certain cartway was a “private road” because H. J. Rask, the
156
petitioner, would be the person “principally benefited.”
However, the court held:
[T]he public, without doubt, has an interest in having
access to the farm in question. A determination of
whether a way be public or private does not depend upon
the number of people who use it, but upon the fact that
everyone desiring to do so may lawfully use it. The right
157
to use, and not the extent of the use, controls.
This concept was rationalized by equating public use with “‘any
use . . . which will satisfy a reasonable public demand for public
facilities for travel or for transmission of intelligence or
158
commodities.’”
This holding is in accordance with the Kettleson
court’s holding that “the access road is established to be for the
159
general public.”
One could offer the counterargument that these cases are
outdated, outmoded, and no longer needed in a modern and
160
developed landscape.
In fact, some states have deemed similar

under the cartway statute. Id. The boundary of Parcel 14 is contiguous to the
public right-of-way of TH 61 for more than two rods, but the steep grade change
allegedly made construction of a driveway for vehicular traffic unreasonable. Id.
Under the cartway statute, arguably ineffective access may not qualify a landowner
to seek relief. See Horton v. Twp. of Helen, 624 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001). But see Mueller v. Supervisors of Courtland, 117 Minn. 290, 297, 135 N.W.
996, 998 (1921) (refusing to overturn a jury verdict granting a petitioner a cartway
even though the petitioner already had inconvenient access to a public way over
his own property).
156. 173 Minn. 572, 573–74, 218 N.W. 115, 115 (1928) (citing Mueller, 117
Minn. at 296, 135 N.W. at 998).
157. Id. at 574, 218 N.W. at 115 (citing Mueller, 117 Minn. at 296, 135 N.W. at
998).
158. Mueller, 117 Minn. at 295, 135 N.W. at 998 (quoting Stewart v. Great
N.R.R. Co., 65 Minn. 515, 517, 68 N.W. 208, 209 (1896)).
159. State ex. rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn.
2011).
160. Cartway statutes, known as private road acts in some jurisdictions,
emanate from colonial times when the country was largely undeveloped.
Meidinger, supra note 6, at 25 (“[S]ince the country consisted largely of wilderness
and since the government could not hope to furnish all the roads needed, ‘the use
of condemnation to open private roads . . . was a necessity if the country was to be
developed at all.’” (quoting Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent
Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 207 (1978))).
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161

statutes unconstitutional. Or, as Lepak did, one could also make
the argument that these cases and their interpretation of public use
were overruled by the 2006 Amendments’ definition of public
162
use.
After all, proceedings under the cartway statute are closely
163
Silver v. Ridgeway
connected to eminent domain proceedings.
164
helps to refute these counterarguments.
Silver was decided after
the 2006 Amendments and continued to favorably cite these
foundational cases, holding that “establishment of a cartway creates
a public road and therefore does not violate the constitutional
165
prohibition against taking private property for a private use.”
This concept of a public road being defined by access has
support in jurisdictions outside of Minnesota and in contexts
beyond cartway statutes. There are a number of cases from other
states that involve a factual scenario similar to Kettleson and rely on
a similar formulation of a public road. In Sturgill v. Kentucky,
Department of Highways, the appellant challenged the use of eminent
domain to provide an access road to a hotel incidentally landlocked
166
by the construction of a highway ramp.
The court resolved the
issue by asking “Have the public the right to [the road’s] use upon
the same terms as the person at whose instance the way was
established? If they have, it is a public use; if they have not, it is a

161. See Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Mich. 2001). The Tolksdorf
court found that the public was not the “predominant interest served by the
private roads act” and the public benefit was “purely incidental and far too
attenuated to support a constitutional taking of private property.” Id. at 168–69
(quoting McKeigan v. Grass Lake Twp. Supervisor, 587 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1998), superseded by 593 N.W.2d 605 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), overruled by
Tolksdorf, 626 N.W.2d 163). However, the facts may have affected the decision. In
Tolksdorf, the owners surrounding the landlocked parcel had long allowed access
to it for recreational purposes, but the petitioner was a real estate developer who
acquired the property with knowledge that it was landlocked, hoping to subdivide
the property and sell lots. Id. at 165–66. Compare Tolksdorf with In re Opening
Private Rd. for Benefit of O’Reilly, in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
seemed poised to also find its state’s private roads act unconstitutional. 5 A.3d
246, 258 (Pa. 2010). Instead, the court remanded the case to allow further
findings of fact as to whether the proposed “private road” taking “might be
regarded as an interconnected course of events” with a highway taking, which
caused the petitioner to become landlocked. Id.
162. See MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subdiv. 11 (2010).
163. Id. § 164.07, subdiv. 8 (“[The appeal] shall be tried in the same manner
as an appeal in eminent domain proceedings under chapter 117.”).
164. 733 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
165. Id. at 169 (citing Mueller v. Supervisors of Courtland, 117 Minn. 290, 296,
135 N.W. 996, 998 (1921)).
166. 384 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Ky. 1964).
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167

private one.” In a similar situation in Ohio, the court held that a
condemnation for a disputed access road was valid because it would
be “open to the public and used by the public as a means of ingress
and egress to and from the business conducted on these
168
premises.”
Further, the Washington high court explained, “Any
public way naturally confers a special benefit on those persons
whose property adjoins it. All roads terminate somewhere. Dead
end streets or highways inevitably and particularly subserve the
169
private interests of the last property owner on the line.” There is
170
no shortage of jurisdictions that have ascribed to this principle.
Admittedly, defining a public road by access, not by use, may
171
not be inherently intuitive.
However, the weight of authority in
Minnesota subscribes to this theory. And even though this
authority is cartway precedent, it is difficult to see how the
underlying facts of these cases are different enough to warrant
separate treatment. There seems to be no reason why cartway
petitions should be treated under this broad “public access is
public use” rule, while lands incidentally landlocked by highway
construction should be evaluated under a different, stricter
framework. The problems are sufficiently analogous to merit
extension of this long-held cartway precedent to the Kettleson access
road. For these reasons, the court made the correct decision as to
the nature of the road.
2.

Looking at the “Project as a Whole” and “Economy to the State” to
Locate a Public Use

The court supported its public use decision by stating that the
167. Id. at 92 (citing Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland, 104 S.W. 762, 765
(1907)).
168. May v. Ohio Tpk. Comm’n, 178 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ohio 1962).
169. State v. Belmont Improvement Co., 495 P.2d 635, 639 (Wash. 1972).
170. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 229 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 1967) (“[T]he
Legislature properly intended such service roads would constitute a public use
whether such road served one property owner or many.”); State v. Totowa Lumber
& Supply Co., 232 A.2d 655, 659 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (“The number of
people who will participate in or benefit by the use for which the property is
condemned is not the determinant of whether the use is or is not a public one.”).
171. Similar to Lepak’s argument, in this author’s opinion the Kettleson access
road does have the appearance of a driveway leading directly to the Parcel’s
garage. Even the local fire authority appears to recognize the road as a driveway as
it has placed the fire number for Parcel 14 on the north side of the approach from
TH 61 (closest to Parcel 16) adding to its appearance as such. See Photograph:
Kettleson access road with accompanying fire number (Aug. 2012) (on file with
author).
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highway improvement was “without question a transportation plan
172
with the over-arching purpose of providing a public benefit,” but
also stating that it “need not decide whether the project must be
viewed as a whole or whether each individual aspect . . . must be
173
examined for a public purpose.”
In addition, the court quoted
Minnesota Statutes section 161.24, expressly stating that “MnDOT
also may acquire land by eminent domain” for “‘connecting the
closed-off highway, street, private road, or entrance with another
174
public highway.’” Yet, the court went on to state, in reference to
section 161.24, that “[w]e do not decide whether the new
definition of public purpose has invalidated the statutory provisions
that allow the Commissioner to condemn land ‘necessary for
connecting’ a private road that is closed off by the highway
175
project.” It is difficult to know how to interpret these apparently
conflicting and contradictory statements.
That a given project should be “taken as a whole” and section
161.24’s stated rationale of “economy to the state” are arguments
that have been used in past Minnesota cases and in many other
jurisdictions facing situations similar to Kettleson to help identify a
proper public purpose. Perhaps the court’s opposing statements
on these points may be best interpreted as implied endorsements
of these propositions as useful tools in locating the limit of proper
public use, yet a manifest desire to limit the scope of its decision.
a.

Kelmar: A Homegrown Example

A sufficiently analogous example of the Minnesota Supreme
Court using “economy to the state” and “taken as a whole”
arguments to support a challenged condemnation can be found in
176
Kelmar Corp. v. District Court.
The factual scenario of Kelmar is
different than Kettleson, yet the decision is instructive. In Kelmar,
MnDOT sought to condemn a portion of the Kelmar Corporation’s
land in conjunction with the construction of the Interstate Trunk
177
Highway No. 494 bridge over the Minnesota River.
However,
Kelmar’s condemned land was not to be used directly by MnDOT.
172. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn.
2011) (emphasis added).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 164 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 161.24, subdiv. 4 (2010)).
175. Id. at 167 (quoting § 161.24, subdiv. 2).
176. 269 Minn. 137, 130 N.W.2d 228 (1964).
177. Id. at 138, 130 N.W.2d at 229.
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Instead, Kelmar’s land would be utilized by the U.S. Corps of
Engineers (the “Corps”) in an independent project of
178
straightening the Minnesota River.
By condemning Kelmar’s
property for use by the Corps, the Corps could modify their project
and allow MnDOT to build a bridge 1500 feet shorter, equating to
179
a savings of $1,646,362 for the state.
Kelmar objected, contending that the purpose of the
condemnation “is not for highway purposes, that the taking is not
necessary but is arbitrary and capricious, and is beyond the
180
authority of the Commissioner of Highways to acquire.”
The
court held:
We are convinced, however, from an examination of the
record and authorities, that the taking of the property in
question is for a public purpose. Although the direct
physical use of the property in question will not be for
highway purposes, its use is nevertheless incidental to and
related to that purpose. The acquisition of the property
in question will make it possible to relocate the main
channel of the river so that a bridge may be constructed
which will more conveniently and economically serve as a
181
public facility.
The court looked at the project as a whole and found that since the
182
This is
taking was “incidental” to highway purposes it was valid.
the essence of the “project as a whole” argument. Identifying the
“economy to the state” argument needs no explanation. One
major difference between Kelmar and Kettleson is the proposed
“non-highway” use for the MnDOT-condemned land. Use by the
Corps for the purpose of maintaining a navigable river is a more
apparent “public use” than the Kettleson access road. Nevertheless,
Kelmar illustrates the principle that the “economy to the state” and
the nature of a taking as incidental to a highway purpose is
something the court will consider.
b.

Not a New Problem: Highway Construction and Isolated
Properties in Other Jurisdictions

Not surprisingly, the landlocked issue presented in Kettleson is
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 139, 130 N.W.2d at 230.
Id. at 140, 130 N.W.2d at 230.
Id. at 141, 130 N.W.2d at 231.
Id.
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not a unique situation. There is a relatively sizeable sample of cases
from jurisdictions across the country in which similar situations
have sparked public use challenges. Where the public use is
validated, courts typically rely on the same list of justifications,
particularly the familiar “project as a whole” and “economy to the
state” propositions.
183
Luke v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority appears to be one of
the early and influential cases addressing the issue of restoring
access to land parcels rendered landlocked by highway
construction. In Luke, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
sought a permanent easement across two parcels for the purpose of
providing ingress and egress to a third parcel, which was deprived
access to a public right-of-way due to no-access provisions in the
184
construction of a tollway.
Following a public use challenge by
one of the neighboring parcels burdened by the easement, the
court concluded:
If the easement or the private way should be viewed in the
abstract, no public purpose would appear. Such an
approach, however, would be closing the eyes to reality.
The laying out of the turnpike . . . and the acquisition of
numerous sites essential to that object are attributes of
one huge undertaking. Procuring an easement and
creating a right of way for the benefit of parcels of land
incidentally deprived of all or of some means of access to
an existing way are but a by-product of that undertaking.
The authority was not engaged in a “roving
185
commission.”
The fact that the taking was a by-product of a highway project
has proved persuasive in the series of cases that followed Luke’s
186
Two cases from North Carolina show that if the lost access
lead.
and taking is a by-product of a highway project, it can be the
183. 149 N.E.2d 225 (Mass. 1958).
184. Id. at 226.
185. Id. at 228 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
186. See Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Morgan, 175 So.2d 606, 609 (Miss.
1965) (“[A] mere by-product of laying out the highway . . . .”); State v. Totowa
Lumber & Supply Co., 232 A.2d 655, 660 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (“The
reasoning used by the Massachusetts court is applicable to this case.”); May v. Ohio
Tpk. Comm’n, 178 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ohio 1962) (“The reasoning used by the
Massachusetts court is applicable to this case. In the construction of a turnpike,
which is for ‘the public welfare’ and ‘the public use,’ it is often necessary that
certain parcels of land be left without access.”); see also 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §
31 (2012); SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 7.06[5] (identifying Luke as a leading case,
which many legal commentaries have expounded upon).
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controlling fact. Independent from a larger project, in 1965 the
North Carolina Supreme Court overruled a highway department’s
condemnation to establish a certain cul-de-sac, holding that it
would be “for the substantial and dominant use and benefit of [one
family] . . . and that the use by, or any benefit for, the general
187
public will be only incidental.”
However, four years later, the
state appellate court reached a different conclusion when the facts
188
were closer to the facts of Kettleson. After a parcel was landlocked
due to the construction of a controlled access highway, the court,
citing Luke, found the highway commission had “ample authority
for the taking here in question as this taking was necessary in order
for it to ‘properly prosecute the work’ involved with [the]
189
project.”
This language strongly suggests that the nature of the
taking was seen as incidental to a highway project, a fact that
helped nudge the court over the line to find a valid public use.
“Economy to the state” is an equally compelling rationale for
many states. Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that financial considerations are a valid part of the public use
190
equation.
The Kentucky court noted that a taking to create a
new access road to serve a landlocked motel would alleviate the
motel’s access issue and “incidentally . . . save a substantial amount
of money (to which [the motel owner] would be entitled as
191
condemnation damages).” The Mississippi court recognized that
destruction of access was unavoidable in limited access highway
projects and, therefore, highway departments need a wide measure
of discretion in laying out these roads in order to keep “with their
192
duty not to expend public moneys needlessly.” Perhaps it was the
Indiana Supreme Court that most forcefully relied on this
193
The court stated, “If the State
“economy to the state” rationale.
187. State Highway Comm’n v. Batts, 144 S.E.2d 126, 136 (N.C. 1965).
188. See N.C. Highway Comm’n v. Ashville Sch. Inc., 169 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1969).
189. Id. at 198 (citation omitted).
190. U.S. ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 554 (1946) (“[T]he
fact that the authority wanted to prevent a waste of government funds . . . [did not
detract] from its power to condemn . . . . The cost of public projects is a relevant
element in all of them, and the government, just as anyone else, is not required to
proceed oblivious to elements of cost . . . . And when serious problems are created
by its public projects, the Government is not barred from making a common sense
adjustment in the interest of all the public.”).
191. Sturgill v. Ky., Dep’t of Highways, 384 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Ky. 1964).
192. Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Morgan, 175 So.2d 606, 609 (Miss. 1965).
193. See Andrews v. State, 229 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. 1967).
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of Indiana is not in a position to minimize the damages paid to
land owners, then the cost of Interstate Highways would soar
astronomically and Indiana would be dotted abnormally with land194
locked real estate.”
There are other examples of states that find
saving money a useful element in justifying similar takings, though
195
there are detractors.
The preceding litany of cases is offered to merely add some
context and background to the court’s decision. There is plenty of
persuasive precedent to support the court’s decision. These cases
offer more evidence that there is no easily definable public use in
these situations; just a judicial weighing of what is “clearly
196
conducive to the welfare of the community,” with “no single
197
fact . . . controlling.” Thomas Merrill showed his frustration with
this amorphous public use analysis when after Midkiff he observed,
“[C]ourts have no theory or conceptual foundation from which
meaningful standards for judicial review of public use issues might
originate” and that “cases are filled with clichés regarding the
‘breadth’ and ‘elasticity’ of the ‘evolving’ concept of public
198
use . . . .”
Merrill offered economic theory as an alternative,
199
which offers a unique perspective to analyze cases like Kettleson.
194. Id. at 810. Also citing an Indiana statute allowing condemnation for
service roads, the court found that “the Legislature properly intended such service
roads would constitute a public use whether such road served one property owner
or many.” Id.
195. See, e.g., State v. Totowa Lumber & Supply Co., 232 A.2d 655, 660 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (“[T]he proposed plan [to build an access road to a
5.3-acre plot of another party which otherwise would be landlocked] was the most
economical of all the other legally possible solutions to the problem here
present.”); State v. Davis, 209 A.2d 633, 635 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965)
(“[T]aking only the land needed for the freeway and then unlocking the resulting
large landlocked areas by condemnation of land for this access road . . . was a
seemingly more economical solution of the problem . . . .”). But see, e.g., Ark. State
Highway Comm’n v. Alcott, 539 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Ark. 1976) (holding that an
access road that would “substantially reduce right-of-way costs and, therefore,
would be in the best interest of the state” was a “private driveway” and not for a
public use, and therefore outside the powers of the state); Saunders v. Titus Cnty.
Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 1, 847 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that these types of takings are “based on economic grounds rather than public use
and [are] justified on the grounds that it will save the public money because there
will be no necessity for condemning the entire tract because there is no access”).
196. See SACKMAN, supra note 2, § 7.02[1].
197. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 167 (Minn.
2011).
198. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 63–
64 (1986) (citation omitted).
199. Id. at 72–94.
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A Different Perspective: Economic Theory and Eminent Domain

Kettleson and other landlocked property cases are emblematic
of a fundamental theoretical economic justification for eminent
200
domain: a market failure.
Not surprisingly, the court did not
engage in this non-legal reasoning. However, it is worth noting
certain economic arguments which provide an alternative
perspective as to how a road that principally benefits one private
party can be a valid exercise of eminent domain.
1.

Holdouts, Bilateral Monopoly, and Rent Seeking

The market failure illustrated in these cases is essentially a
form of the “holdout problem,” a basic and widely discussed
201
economic argument for eminent domain. The holdout problem
occurs when a landowner is unwilling to voluntarily sell his or her
land to the government when the government seeks the land for a
project that will have certain socially desirable benefits and an
202
overall economic surplus. This problem is particularly applicable
203
In
to right-of-way-acquiring entities like a highway department.
right-of-way acquisitions, the holdout problem can lead to
increased transaction costs when, after the route for a highway is
selected and changing that route becomes very costly, property
200. Thomas Miceli provides a helpful explanation of market failures and their
relation to eminent domain that is best conveyed by quotation:
[E]minent domain is a forced sale of property from the current owner to
another owner . . . in an effort to achieve some public objective. The
question is, why does the sale have to be forced? According to economic
theory, the purpose of exchange, whether voluntary or involuntary, is to
transfer resources to higher-valued uses; in other words, to realize some
gains from trade. Under ideal conditions, that goal is best achieved
through ordinary market exchange, with the government’s role being
limited to the protection of property rights and the enforcement of
contracts. Any departure from this paradigm is therefore justifiable only
if there is some reason to believe that the market will fail to operate
efficiently.
THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN 151 (2011).
201. See id. at 27–31; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (8th ed.
2011).
202. See MICELI, supra note 200, at 27–31. Economic surplus refers to the
increased value of the land after the transfer or transactions. Cohen, supra note
14, at 539. One critique of eminent domain is that the condemnor reaps all the
benefits of the economic surplus because the condemnee is only compensated for
the “market value of the property at the time of the taking” and not “any element
resulting subsequently to or because of the taking.” Id. at 539 n.330.
203. POSNER, supra note 201, at 71.
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owners “in the path of the advancing line [are] tempted to hold
204
out for a very high price.” The economic issue with this situation
205
is one of efficient allocation of resources. Land is held by owners
seeking inflated compensation for their land, leading to increased
cost of highway construction, delay, and possibly abandonment of
206
publicly beneficial projects.
When projects are abandoned for
this reason, land is left “in its existing, less valuable uses, and this is
207
inefficient.”
Holdouts seeking inflated compensation may have different
motivations, and this is an important distinction to note. There are
strategic owners that are simply looking to extract as large a portion
208
as possible of the economic surplus created by the transaction.
Alternatively, there are idiosyncratic owners for which “no mutually
agreeable price may exist for a number of reasons: a person might
hold a sentimental attachment to his land, have sufficient wealth to
meet his needs, and be unwilling to sell the land for any price the
209
Idiosyncratic owners often embody the
state is willing to offer.”
principle that all land is unique, so there is a subjective value often
difficult to ascertain and properly account for in the just
210
compensation calculation.
The access roads in Kettleson and the other cases are not strict
holdout problems, but are “bilateral monopoly” problems, a sub211
category of the holdout phenomenon. A bilateral monopoly is a
transaction including only one buyer and one seller where neither
212
party has an alternative but to negotiate with the other.
As one
author notes:
A single buyer and single seller may not be able to reach a
mutually agreeable price, even though one exists, because
neither the buyer nor the seller has any alternative party
with whom to bargain. The result is excessive haggling
over the surplus, and this haggling may entail transaction
costs that are high and, in some instances, prohibitive if
213
they exceed the gains-from-trade.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
MICELI, supra note 200, at 28.
POSNER, supra note 201, at 71.
See Kelly, supra note 5.
Id. at 348 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
MICELI, supra note 200, at 34–35.
Id. at 35.
Kelly, supra note 5, at 349.
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Landlocked parcels are a quintessential bilateral monopoly
214
The bilateral monopoly of the landlocked parcel
situation.
problem has prompted courts and legislatures to allow a private
party to compel a transfer of land from an existing owner, as in the
215
case of the above discussed private road acts.
2.

Merrill’s Economics of Public Use

In 1986, Thomas Merrill offered a theory to refashion the
public use analysis from an economic perspective in his influential
216
Kettleson provides an
article, The Economics of Public Use.
opportunity to revisit Merrill’s argument and determine if his
suggested framework provides helpful insight into the economics
of the court’s decision. Merrill starts with the same premises
discussed above: that eminent domain can be justified by market
217
failures and the holdout problem.
This is what Merrill calls a
“thin market setting,” which is what induces the strategic owner’s
behavior and excessive haggling that leads to “monopoly pricing by
218
the seller, to unacceptably high transaction costs, or to both.”
Merrill goes on to theorize that thin markets and their
potential to produce rent seeking behavior “make it economically
219
efficient to confer the power of eminent domain on a buyer.”
After factoring in the extra “‘due process’ costs of eminent
220
Merrill hypothesizes that in a truly “thin market
domain,”
221
setting,” the use of eminent domain is “self-regulating.”
That is,
if there is not a thin market and the related market exchange
failures discussed above, then the government is unlikely to use

214. Id.
215. See supra Part IV.B.1. However, Miceli cautions that there “is the risk that
any two-party transaction could potentially be labeled as a bilateral monopoly,
given the unobservability of transaction costs.” MICELI, supra note 200, at 35. In a
holdout situation, contrary to a bilateral monopoly, the presence of many sellers
“is evidence that bargaining is likely to fail.” Id. Miceli suggest that courts should
more closely scrutinize takings in such two-party transactions. Id.
216. Merrill, supra note 198.
217. Id. at 65 (“I argue that eminent domain’s purpose is to overcome barriers
to voluntary exchange created when a seller of resources is in position to extract
economic rents from a buyer.”).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 76.
220. Id. at 77 (explaining that the eminent domain procedure is expensive and
requires drafting and filing a complaint, serving process, securing a formal
appraisal, the possibility of trial, and appeal, etc.).
221. Id. at 80.
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eminent domain because it will be more expensive than transacting
in the open market. Consequently, Merrill concludes that in this
setting, “courts need do nothing to limit the use of eminent
domain,” reinforcing the judicial deference annunciated in Berman,
222
Midkiff, and Kelo.
The alternative public use inquiry is then to
identify market failures, which gives the judiciary a different role in
reviewing the exercise of eminent domain, that is, “a more narrowly
223
focused and judicially manageable inquiry.”
3.

Application to Kettleson

Kettleson appears to acutely illustrate the bilateral monopoly
issue. The buyer (MnDOT) and the seller (Lepak) had no other
option but to negotiate with each other. By holding out, Lepak
could gain a much more favorable bargaining position because the
state’s only alternative was to compensate Parcel 14 for the loss of
224
access.
Negotiations failed as each party sought to secure for
225
In a very
themselves the largest share of the surplus profit.
rudimentary sense, the surplus profit could be represented by the
likely gross difference in value between the complete loss of access
226
to a $371,200 parcel (Parcel 15), and a 35 foot strip of a $69,600
227
parcel (Parcel 14).
This apparent disparity in relative values
seems to provide strong evidence of a holdout or bilateral
monopoly problem. Together, MnDOT, the general public, and
Parcel 15 appear to be the higher-value users of the property,
which, if in their possession, would result in certain socially
desirable benefits and an overall economic surplus. Thus, Merrill’s
basic premise lends support to the conclusion that the court’s
decision is further supported by the presence of a market failure,
and with that market failure, the state’s exercise of eminent
222. Id. at 81; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
223. Merrill, supra note 198, at 67.
224. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 440, 127 N.W.2d 165, 169
(1964) (“The weight of authority, including Minnesota, treats access to a public
highway from abutting property as a right which may not be denied without
compensation.”).
225. See MICELI, supra note 200, at 35 (describing how transaction costs
increase in bilateral monopolies).
226. Tax Statement for Wendell L. & Linda E. Herron, Trustees, Property ID: 25-0470020, COOK CNTY. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.co.cook.mn.us/property/detail.php
?pid=25-047-0020.
227. Tax Statement for Richard Stanley Lepak, Property ID: 25-047-0010, COOK
CNTY. (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.co.cook.mn.us/property/detail.php?pid=25-047
-0010.
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domain would seem self-regulating and appropriate to receive
judicial deference on economic grounds alone.
V. CONCLUSION
Public use is a notoriously indefinable requisite to a valid,
constitutional exercise of the government’s eminent domain
power. There is well-established precedent in both the United
States as a whole and Minnesota specifically, that the courts will
defer to legislative determinations of public use. These legislative
choices are reversed by the judiciary only when clearly erroneous,
228
arbitrary, or capricious.
This extensive discretion granted to
highway departments like MnDOT, and other legislativeempowered condemning authorities, means eminent domain
petitions are rarely overruled by the court.
When a taking is challenged in isolated property cases like
Kettleson, courts have long been challenged to clearly articulate why
using eminent domain to establish an access road is a valid public
use. After all, the isolated parcel owner appears to be the
dominant beneficiary, not the public. The Kettleson court was
similarly unable to identify any single governing principle as to why
the taking was valid. To find a public use in these cases, courts
have consistently offered a series of similar justifications. They
229
define a public road as simply any road accessible by the public.
In highway cases like Kettleson, they find the challenged taking is
incidental to the larger, indisputably public use. They reason that
the public finances must be protected. Or, in an attempt to bring
some logical framework to the fluid, fact-specific judicial analysis of
public use, theorists leave the legal realm altogether in search of
economic answers. This note shows that perhaps the best that can
be done in challenging public use cases is to look at a range of
analogous cases, theories, and persuasive precedent to determine
whether the facts fall within the generally accepted range of “public
use.” After all, no fact is controlling.

228. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Minn.
2011).
229. Id. at 167.
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